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PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE-IS THERE A RECOG-
NIZED BASIS FOR ADMISSIBILITY?
By JOHN E. MOUSER AND JAMES T. PHILBIN
The admissibility of photographs in evidence is well established; the
basis of admissibility appears to be something less than well established.
The most clearly articulated basis for the admittance of photographs in
evidence is given by Wigmore in his analysis of a photograph as "a witness'
pictured expression of the data observed by him."' The majority of deci-
sions dealing with the admissibility of photographs in evidence do not fully
recognize the pictured expression theory as expounded by Wigmore, and
are far from clear as to what theory they do recognize. This comment will
review, primarily, the California cases that appear to conflict with the pic-
tured expression theory, and will make a brief inquiry into the possibility
that a photograph may tell its own story.
A Photograph as the Pictured Communication
of a Qualified Witness
If, as Wigmore states, a photograph is "a witness' pictured expression
of the data observed by him,"2 it follows logically that in order to be admis-
sible it must be made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Wigmore
accordingly so states: ".. . [I]n brief, it must appear that there is a witness
who has competent knowledge, and that the picture is affirmed by him to
represent it."'
Although there has been neither an express repudiation nor a clear rec-
ognition of a pictured expression theory by the California courts, there are
occasional decisions that tend to support his analysis. Generally, however,
the California courts base admissibility on the somewhat vague generality
that if it is shown that the photograph is a faithful reproduction of what
it purports to represent, it is admissible.' No clear definition has been given
as to what constitutes a showing that the photograph is a faithful repro-
duction of what it purports to represent, but those decisions that allow a
witness, not necessarily the photographer,5 to establish that the photograph
is a faithful reproduction are in accord with the pictured expression theory.
However, no cases have been found that specifically impose the require-
ment that there must be a qualified witness as a requisite for introduction
of photographs in evidence. It seems that the California courts recognize
1 3 WIGMOm, EvWDNCE § 792 (3d ed. 1940).
2 Ibid.
3 Id. at § 793.
4 Berkovitz v. American River Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 201, 215 Pac. 675 (1923) ; People
v. Ah Lee, 164 Cal. 350, 352, 128 Pac. 1035 (1912) ; People v. Cunna, 107 Cal. App. 2d 382,
387, 237 P.2d 12 (1951) ; People v. Crooms, 66 Cal. App. 2d 491, 496, 152 P.2d 533 (1944) ;
People v. Glab, 15 Cal. App. 2d 120, 124, 59 P.2d 195 (1936) ; Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal. App. 2d 28,
40, 45 P.2d 350 (1935).
5 Holland v. Kerr, 116 Cal. App. 2d 31, 37, 253 P.2d 88 (1953).
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that the pictured expression theory is one way in which admissibility of a
photograph may be established.
Indicative of the fact that the California courts recognize some other
basis as well, are other decisions, the most outstanding of which is People
v. Doggett.6 In that case a husband and wife were convicted of a violation
of section 288a of the California Penal Code, which makes criminal all acts
of oral sexual perversion. The only evidence introduced at the trial to sup-
port a conviction was a photograph of the husband and wife in the commis-
sion of the alleged act. Supporting witnesses testified only as to the probable
authenticity of the photographs without having perceived the commission
of the alleged act. Other cases that are contra to the pictured expression
theory are those that say it is within the discretion of the trial judge to de-
termine whether the photograph is a correct representation of the object or
scene in question.7 Wigmore makes it plain that the objection that a photo-
graph may misrepresent goes only to its credibility and not to its admis-
sibility: "Occasionally a Court is found excluding a photograph as being
misleading; but this is a begging of the very question which the jury have
to decide; it would be as anomalous as if the judge were to order a witness
from the stand because he was believed by the judge to be lying. Perjury
cannot be thus determined in advance by the judge,--not more for photo-
graphic than for verbal testimony."1
8
In order to better point up another area of conflict with the pictured
expression theory, it is necessary to go to the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions. Scott groups certain decisions under the heading of "Weight and
Conclusiveness"9 that would seem to contradict the pictorial expression
theory in that a mere difference in the form of a witness' expression, from
verbal to pictorial, should not increase credibility to the extent that pic-
torial expression testimony should, because of its form, overcome all verbal
testimony that is contrary. To speak of "conclusiveness," or even "weight,"
except to the extent that some added weight might be given because of
clarity of expression, would indicate that these courts regard photographic
evidence as something more than a "pictured expression." The cases that
Scott cites as giving conclusive effect to photographs do not discuss the
basis for admissibility, but seem concerned primarily with the effect to be
given photographic evidence once it is admitted. The language used does
indicate that the courts are not cognizant of the pictured expression theory.
For example:
"What may be seen from a certain place under admitted or undisputed
conditions and circumstances, and the view or line of sight under such cir-
0 People v. Doggett, 83 Cal. App. 2d 405, 409, 188 P.2d 792 (1948).
7 People v. Cunna, 107 Cal. App. 2d 382, 387, 237 P.2d 12 (1951) ; People v. Bundte,
87 Cal. App. 2d 735, 747, 197 P.2d 283 (1948) ; Miller v. Silvester, 140 Cal. App. 345, 35 P.2d
387 (1934).
8 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 792 (3d ed. 1940).
0 Scor, P oToOGRApmc EVIDENCE § 607 (Supp. 1955).
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cumstances is a physical fact, clearly and unequivocally demonstrable by
photographic evidence."" (Emphasis added.)
The few California decisions" that have touched on the subject of con-
clusiveness have held that photographs were not conclusive, but the treat-
ment has been so general in these cases that it would be difficult to say
whether the inconclusive nature of the photographs was attributed to the
particular facts of the case or whether the inconclusiveness was regarded
as an inherent characteristic.
A Properly Verified Photograph as a Silent Witness
In the Doggett case, the photographs were the only "witnesses" that
testified of the commission of the alleged act. This poses the question, may
a properly verified photograph tell its own story? That it may to some
extent, seems implicit in decisions from other jurisdictions that have char-
acterized a photograph as "the unvarnished truth,"' 2 the "physical facts,"'"
and as a "silent witness."' 4 In addition, legal writers 5 and a judges' dicta'
have discussed the possibility of a photograph telling its own story. And
even where it purports to be nothing more than the non-verbal testimony
of a qualified witness it should be recognized that to a certain extent a pho-
tograph tells its own story. Since a photograph sees in more detail, remem-
bers more accurately, and transmits its message more clearly than a human
witness, it would seem in almost every case to testify to additional facts
not recounted by its sponsor.
One example of photographs, which, when properly verified, may tell
their own story are x-ray photographs. The admissibility of this class of
photographs is well established.' After the person x-rayed is identified,
and testimony establishes that proper equipment and technique were em-
ployed, the expert witness testifies as to the effect of the condition reflected
by the x-ray without ever having actually perceived the particular bone
structure or other internal conformation.
Although no case has been found, somewhat analogous situations would
exist where pictures were taken at night with an infra red flash bulb when
the photographer could not perceive the objects photographed, or a picture
which is automatically taken when someone actuates some type of photo-
electric or mechanical trip mechanism. In such situations the time and place
10 Lohmann v. Wabash Ry. Co., 364 Mo. 910, 269 S.W.2d 885, 891 (1954).
11 Elford v. Hiltabrand, 63 Cal. App. 2d 65, 72, 146 P.2d 510 (1944) ; Vaca v. Southern
Pacific Co., 91 Cal. App. 470, 473, 267 Pac. 346 (1928).
12Hartley v. A. I. Rudd Lumber Co., 282 Mich. 652, 267 N.W. 712 (1937).
13 Lohman v. Wabash Ry. Co., 364 Mo. 910, 269 S.W.2d 885 (1954); Carner v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry. Co., 338 Mo. 257, 89 S.W.2d 947 (1935).
14 Watkins v. Reinhardt, 293 Ala. 243, 9 So.2d 113 (1942).
15McKELvEY, EVIDENCE § 381 (5th ed. 1944); Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court,
24 N.C.L. REv. 233 (1946).
16 Farris, C.J.S.C. in Army & Navy Dept. Store (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Wholesale &
Dept. Store Union Local No. 535, 2 D.L.R. 850, 853 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1950).
17 3 WIcMORE, EVIDENCE § 795 (3d ed. 1940) ; Scott, X-ray Pictures as Evidence, 44 MICH.
L. REv. 773, 788 (1944).
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could be ascertained with a high degree of accuracy, and the view of the
object or scene portrayed would seem highly reliable. If such photographs
were admitted in evidence, they would have to speak for themselves be-
cause of the absence of perceptive witnesses as to the scene or object por-
trayed. Just as in x-ray photographs, there is an absence of perceptive
witnesses. X-rays are admitted into evidence by the courts with little or no
recognition of this aspect."
The foregoing discussion assumes the photograph has been properly
verified. Wigmore, in his logical exposition of the pictured expression
theory, states that a qualified witness need only say the photograph rep-
resents the facts as he saw them, and the photograph is thereby properly
verified.' 9 Obviously where there is no witness something other than a
qualified witness must be used as a standard, and the question of proper
verification may become quite involved. X-ray photographs again serve
as a good illustration. It is suggested" that they should be supported by
testimony as to: (1) the person x-rayed, (2) physical condition at the time
of the x-ray as compared to the time in issue, (3) proper equipment and
operating technique, and (4) an explanation of the x-ray procedure em-
ployed. That courts are apt to admit x-rays with one or more of the fore-
going requirements missing2l seems to be indicative that no one basis for
admissibility is clearly recognized. Photographs in general are not taken
under circumstances as controlled as are x-ray photographs, so that equip-
ment, technique and manner would require more careful examination in
order to properly verify the picture. Scott in his exhaustive work, Photo-
graphic Evidence, treats in great detail the various methods and techniques
which may be used to produce false representations by photographs.2 Some
recognition of the possibility of photographic misrepresentation can be
found in the California cases.2
Just what would amount to proper verification has never been clearly
defined by the courts.24 The variety of statements in the ALR annotation2 5
would seem to indicate that the courts are making rules to fit the occasion,
rather than starting with a basic theory and formulating a logical set of
rules.
18 Bruce v. Western Pipe & Steel Co., 177 Cal. 25, 27, 169 Pac. 660 (1917) ; Wlburn v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 111, 112, 60 P.2d 188 (1936); De Martini v. McDonnel,
14 Cal.App.2d 405, 406, 58 P.2d 170 (1936); Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal.App. 2d 28, 40, 45 P.2d 350
(1935).
19 3 WmOOE, EVJDENcE § 793 (3d ed. 1940).
2 0 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 17.
21 Ibid.
22See generally ScoTr, PHToRaRnmc EviDExcE (1942).
2 3 People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 498, 197 P.2d 1 (1948) ; Harmon v. San Joaquin Light
& Power Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 169, 174, 98 P.2d 1064 (1940).
24 9 A.L.R.2d 899, at 904 (1950).
25 9 A.L.R.2d 899 (1950).
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Conclusion
The failure of the courts in the past to recognize the possibility of a
photograph telling its own story may be ascribed to various reasons. In the
first place, photographs were first offered into evidence before the photo-
graphic process was very well developed, so that the sponsoring witness was
also testifying to the accuracy of the photographic process. 6 In addition,
the overwhelming number of photographs are undoubtedly sponsored by
individuals who were also eye-witnesses to the scene or object depicted
therein. And finally the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the "silent
witness" may have influenced the courts.
Where the photograph has been verified by an eye-witness, the practi-
cal result seems the same regardless of which theory of admissibility is
adopted. The photograph is providing the testimony, and to say it is only
the pictured testimony of a witness does not change the result. It is when
the problem of a "no-eyewitness" picture comes up that the theories work
a different practical result. A strict adherence to the pictured expression
theory would keep out some highly reliable evidence, e.g., x-rays. How-
ever, it has the advantage of easy application because of the development
of law concerning the admissibility of verbal testimony. What theory the
California courts will adopt will probably not be answered in any detail
until they are faced with more Doggett type situations.
2 6 ScoTT, PnoTOmAPmc EvmDucE § 1 (1942).
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